

Transcript of Ex Parte Briefing

10/23/2018

Avoided Cost, Resource Planning and Energy Storage in an Era of Low-Cost Solar ND-2018-23-E

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Before the Public Service Commission of South Carolina Columbia, South Carolina

October 23, 2018 2:00 p.m.

Allowable Ex Parte Briefing ND-2018-23-E

South Carolina Solar Business Alliance,

Incorporated - Request for an Allowable Ex Parte

Briefing Regarding Avoided Cost, Resource Planning and
Energy Storage in an Era of Low-Cost Solar

TRANSCRIPT OF ALLOWABLE PROCEEDINGS

EX PARTE BRIEFING

HEARING BEFORE: Vice Chairman Elliott F. Elam; Commissioner G. O'Neal Hamilton; Commissioner Thomas J. "Tom" Ervin; Commissioner Justin T. Williams;

ADVISOR TO COMMISSION: Joseph Melchers, Esq. Legal Advisory Staff

APPEARANCES

Richard L. Whitt, Esq., representing South Carolina Solar Business Alliance, LLC; together with Hamilton Davis, Esq. (Southern Current, LLC), Steven J. Levitas, Esq. (Cypress Creek Renewables, LLC), and Ronald DiFelice, Ph.D. (Energy Intelligence Partners).

Jeffrey M. Nelson, Esq., representing the South Carolina Office of Regulatory Staff.

REPORTED BY:
Kathleen R. Tackett, CVR-M

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Steven J. Levitas, Esq
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Please note the following inclusions/attachments to the record:
PowerPoint Presentation Slides (PDF) re: "Avoided Cost Resource Planning, & Energy Storage."
PowerPoint Presentation Slides (PDF) re: "Energy Storage - SC Ex Parte Briefing."

1	PROCEEDINGS
2	VICE CHAIRMAN ELAM: Good afternoon.
3	Welcome to this allowable ex parte. Call it
4	to order and ask our counsel, Mr. Melchers, to
5	read the docket.
6	MR. MELCHERS: Thank you, Mr. Acting
7	Chairman and Commissioners. We're here
8	pursuant to notice of request for allowable ex
9	parte communication briefing. The person
10	requesting the briefing is Richard Whitt, and
11	he has brought a number of folks to help us
12	with the briefing, from Southern Current,
13	Cypress Creek Renewables, and Energy
14	Intelligence Partners. It is scheduled for
15	today, October 23rd, at 2 p.m., here in the
16	Commission hearing room, and our subject
17	matter to be discussed today is avoided cost,
18	resource planning, and energy storage in an
19	era of low-cost solar. Thank you, sir.
20	VICE CHAIRMAN ELAM: Okay. We'll
21	start with appearances. I guess we'll go with
22	ORS first and ask if they could also follow
23	that up with going over the ground rules.
24	MR. NELSON: Thank you, Mr.
25	Chairman. I'm Jeff Nelson on behalf of the

1	Office of Regulatory Staff, and I'll as it
2	is our custom, I'm going to do a little
3	introduction here just to kind of set the
4	ground rules so that everybody knows how
5	things work today.
6	My name's Jeff Nelson. I'm the
7	chief counsel for the Office of Regulatory
8	Staff, and I am here as the designee of the
9	executive director of ORS, who is required
10	under South Carolina law to certify the
11	proceedings in front of the Commission today.
12	This is allowable ex parte, as Mr. Melchers
13	has said. It's presented by the South
14	Carolina Solar Business Alliance, and it's to
15	be conducted in accordance with the provisions
16	of South Carolina Code Annotated, Section 58-
17	3-260C. As the ORS representative, it's my
18	duty to certify the record of this proceeding
19	to the chief clerk of the Public Service
20	Commission that's Ms. Jocelyn Boyd
21	within 72 hours of this briefing taking place.
22	The requirements, also, under the
23	statute, are that, in part, the allowable ex
24	parte needs to be confined to the subject
25	matter that's been noticed in a public notice

1	that was given today. And, again, the topic
2	being avoided cost, resource planning, and
3	energy in an era of low-cost solar. So both
4	presenters and Commissioners, I'd ask you,
5	please, remain on topic as best you can.
6	Under the provisions of 58-3-260,
7	participants, commissioners, and commission
8	staff are prohibited from requesting or giving
9	"any commitment, predetermination, or
10	prediction regarding any action that the
11	Commission may take as to any ultimate or
12	penultimate issue that is either before or is
13	likely to come before the Commission." So,
14	again, we ask that the presenters not ask for
15	opinions or for decisions by the Commission
16	and, of course, that the commissioners refrain
17	from doing so.
18	Finally, everyone here in attendance
19	today has to read and sign the form that you
20	should've been given when you came in today.
21	Please actually read the form. Please make
22	sure you sign it, and please make sure that
23	it's turned in before you leave today. That's
24	another thing that has to be certified, is
25	actually the attendance list, balancing

1	against those signed documents.
2	So that's all I have, Mr. Melchers.
3	Thank you. Mr. Chairman.
4	VICE CHAIRMAN ELAM: Thank you, Mr.
5	Nelson. Mr. Whitt?
6	MR. WHITT: Thank you, Mr. Vice
7	Chairman, other commissioners, and Mr.
8	Melchers. We want to thank you for the
9	opportunity to appear here today for the South
10	Carolina Solar Business Alliance. We
11	appreciate your time. We know you're busy
12	with the upcoming hearing. We also appreciate
13	your staff who helped us put this together
14	today. So we appreciate that, and, Mr. Vice
15	Chairman, may I take a moment to introduce
16	some of my clients that are here?
17	VICE CHAIRMAN ELAM: Please do.
18	MR. WHITT: Okay. We have Bret
19	Sowers, who's the vice president of Southern
20	Current, and he's also chairman of the SCSBA,
21	is here. We have Patty Wright from Pine Gate
22	Renewables. We have Andrew Berrier, from
23	Pine Gate, is here, also. And we have Jarrett
24	Branham of Alder Energy Systems. We have
25	Steven Shirey of NCRE, and I don't know, did

1	Luke Rogers make it today? Luke, and Eric
2	Panicco from Birdseye are here, and we
3	appreciate them being here, also.
4	Before I call the panel, Mr. Vice
5	Chairman, I want to say for the record the
6	thing that we always say is that we have
7	attorneys participating today, but they are
8	participating as subject-matter experts, and
9	they're not here to represent anyone today as
10	attorneys, okay?
11	Well, thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman. We'd
12	like to call Hamilton Davis of Southern
13	Current, Steve Levitas of Cypress Creek, and
14	Dr. Ronald DiFelice of Energy Intelligence
15	Partners. And Hamilton Davis will start
16	first.
17	VICE CHAIRMAN ELAM: Good afternoon,
18	gentleman. Just start when you're ready.
19	MR. DAVIS: Good afternoon. Good to see
20	most of our commissioners here today. Thank
21	y'all for taking the time to listen to what we
22	have to say. It's been a little while since I
23	appeared before this Commission, so it's good
24	to be back. I see two new faces.
25	Commissioner Williams, Commissioner Ervin,

1	congratulations on your appointment, and good
2	to be talking with you today.
3	So, here at the outset, my job here
4	is kind of prepare you guys for the
5	presentations you're going to hear after me,
6	so I'm going to lay a little bit of groundwork
7	that, maybe, will help with what you hear
8	later on. But what I would like to encourage
9	is questions from you guys. We don't often
10	get to appear. I think not often enough, have
11	this opportunity to have a thoughtful
12	discussion. Certainly, it's going to be
13	partially a presentation, but I'd like for it
14	to be a discussion as well. I know, within a
15	contested case, it is filled with a lot of
16	complicated issues and very smart technical
17	experts, and it's not the type of discussion
18	that we hope to bring you today. It's a
19	little bit higher level and takes a bigger-
20	picture perspective, trying to fit some of the
21	pieces together that are critical to our
22	business model and important to the folks of
23	South Carolina and looking at it from that
24	perspective.
25	So I want to start by just talking
1	

1	about and pointing to some of the changes
2	we've seen in the industry over the last
3	decade. If you go back to 2009, especially in
4	a state like South Carolina, you could
5	definitely make the statement that solar maybe
6	was a fringe technology. It was not playing a
7	large role in our energy sector. That's
8	changed dramatically over the last ten years.
9	If you look at this from a from a cost
10	perspective, go back to 2009, we've seen the
11	cost per watt of solar above \$7. That's
12	dropped now, in 2018, to below \$2 per watt.
13	We've also seen installed capacity over that
14	same timeline grow from a rate of less than a
15	gigawatt a year to over 10 gigawatts per year,
16	nationally.
17	Going back to 2017, over 40 percent
18	of the installed capacity new energy in the
19	United States last year was from solar power.
20	We take a look at what's happened in the
21	states around South Carolina. We see today
22	that North Carolina is second in the nation
23	for installed solar capacity, at 4.4
24	gigawatts, which translates into about \$6.5
25	billion that has been invested in that state

1	to bring those projects on line. Georgia is
2	now tenth in installed capacity, with about
3	1.5 gigawatts, which translates into about \$2
4	billion invested in that state to bring those
5	projects on line. And, just recently, we've
6	seen, in Virginia, Dominion Energy announced
7	that they plan to develop over 3,000 megawatts
8	of solar in just the next few years, which
9	will put them on pace to enter into the top
10	ten nationally for the rate at which solar's
11	coming on.
12	Just for some comparison to South
13	Carolina, today South Carolina is 18th in
14	installed capacity with about 591 megawatts in
15	the ground. That translates into about \$840
16	million that have been invested into the
17	state, and our projected growth is around
18	Number 20, nationally.
19	Of course, with all of this
20	investment comes jobs, and we can see that
21	from this chart, where the industry has grown
22	over the last ten years from less than 100,000
23	jobs, to over 250,000 nationally. So this is,
24	indeed, a job of a growth sector in the
25	economy.

1	I was very involved in 2013 to 2015.
2	I think I I felt like I spent fully two
3	years of my life working on Act 236, that you
4	guys are very familiar with. That was a
5	modest step forward on solar in South
6	Carolina, but it was an important one, and I
7	think it was a successful one. It got our
8	state into a place where we had the
9	experience, we had the exposure to think a bit
10	more critically, more effectively, about how
11	we really make this resource work in our
12	state.
13	From an on-the-ground perspective, we
14	have over 1,000 megawatts of executed PPAs now
15	in South Carolina, which most of them most
16	of which are in SCE&G territory. But,
17	statewide, it's a little bit higher than that.
18	We have over \$5 billion of projects proposed
19	in the state, in the development pipeline, in
20	the utilities interconnection queues, which
21	translate into \$750 million in wages and \$25
22	million a year in property-tax revenue. And,
23	three short years later, after passing Act
24	236, I think you see a much more sophisticated
25	industry at play here. I also think you see a

1	much more complicated energy landscape in
2	South Carolina.
3	So, as a result of that, whether you're
4	talking about integrated resource planning or
5	avoided cost or a myriad of other factors,
6	there are hundreds of millions of dollars and
7	billions of dollars on the line when we make
8	decisions about how we're going to power the
9	future of this state. Where is that going to
10	come from, who's going to pay for it, and are
11	those least-cost resources?
12	So I think the question that the solar
13	industry is always looking to answer as we
14	move into different markets is are we holding
15	ourselves to best practices? Are we operating
16	in an environment where the industry has
17	appropriate standards in place so that we can
18	go in and actually compete? So, whether it's
19	cybersecurity or grid modernization,
20	distributed energy resources, energy storage,
21	integrated resource planning, there are
22	literally a flood of other issues and
23	considerations that lay ahead of us in the
24	near future. There are billions of dollars
25	that are going to be invested in this energy

landscape in the state. Are those investments in the best interest of ratepayers? Are they in the best interest of South Carolina's economy? We, as solar developers, are looking forward to an opportunity to compete and compete effectively. That requires regulatory rigor, transparency, accurate price signals so that we can compete, access to the grid. It requires a recognition of things like IRPs and avoided costs are intimately connected; you can't talk about one without talking about the other. And we believe that the Commission has fundamentally been empowered by the General Assembly to hold us, the solar industry, utilities, and anyone else that comes behind comes in front of you to best practices. The South Carolina laws create a framework to regulate, but you guys create the rules. And, so, at the end of the day, we rely heavily on the Public Service Commission and regulators in every state we operate in to ensure that a fair opportunity exists to compete at a reasonable scale. And we think		
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25 compete at a reasonable scale. And we think	24	ensure that a fair opportunity exists to
	25	compete at a reasonable scale. And we think

1 engendering more competition in this state is 2 in the economic best interest of both 3 ratepayers and the South Carolina economy. 4 And, so, to that end, I'm going to turn 5 this over to Steve Levitas to talk a little 6 more about what competition means to our 7 industry and how we get there. 8 MR. LEVITAS: Thank you, Hamilton. And, 9 thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman and members of 10 the Commission. It's a pleasure to be back 11 with you again today. I am Steve Levitas with 12 Cypress Creek Renewables. I'm our senior vice 13 president for regulatory affairs. 14 I've got a fairly, somewhat longish, 15 prepared presentation, so I'd just like to 16 encourage and invite you: If you would like 17 to interrupt me at any time with questions, 18 I'd be happy to entertain them as we go along. 19 So let me let me start by saying that, 20 as we all know, the US economy is founded on 21 free markets and competition. The one 22 exception to this fundamental principal in our 23 capitalist system is where natural monopolies 24 exist, meaning that it doesn't make practical 25 or economic sense to have multiple market		
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or economic sense to have multiple market	24	exist, meaning that it doesn't make practical
	25	or economic sense to have multiple market

1	participants. In these cases, it's essential
2	that we have regulatory bodies like this
3	Commission to set pricing and ensure that
4	customers are protected from the potential
5	abuse of monopoly power. If you take a look
6	at this slide, you may recall, Commissioner
7	Elam, when you noted that the Commission's
8	regulation of utilities "attempts to replicate
9	the conditions that a company in a competitive
10	market would face." But I want to emphasize,
11	and I suspect everyone in the room would
12	agree, that the regulation of monopolists is a
13	challenging and imperfect undertaking.
14	Regulated monopolies, a necessary evil, I
15	would say, in the case of true natural
16	monopolies, should be the rare exception in
17	our economic system. And free-market
18	competition, I think we all believe, should be
19	promoted wherever possible. That's why over
20	the past several decades we've seen
21	significant transition from regulated monopoly
22	structures to competitive markets in sectors
23	such as telecommunications and airline
24	industries, and this has benefitted customers
25	by unleashing innovation and dramatically

lowering prices. In the electric industry, there's no question that transmission and distribution services remain a natural monopoly. Since no one would want to see competing systems of wires crisscrossing the landscape, we need to maintain our current system of assigned service territories with pricing regulated by state commissions inferred. In contrast, however, electric generation is not a natural monopoly, and there's no reason that we should allow monopoly utilities to be insulated from competitive pressure in providing generation services. As a result of this fact, 13 states plus the District of Columbia have had deregulated generation markets for almost two decades, which are operating successfully today. As this slide illustrates, these markets have been substantially have seen substantially sorry. Thank you. As this slide illustrates, these markets have seen substantially better results for customers than states with regulated monopoly- generation markets. I realize it's a little		
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	23	have seen substantially better results for
generation markets. I realize it's a little	24	customers than states with regulated monopoly-
	25	generation markets. I realize it's a little

1	hard to see. I think you have hard copies in
2	front of you, but, essentially, the green
3	line, the bottom lines, are the customer-
4	choice markets that show significantly better
5	performance than the regulated markets. More
6	states would have almost certainly joined the
7	wave of deregulation in the 1990s and early
8	2000s had certain design flaws in the early
9	programs and market practices, notably in
10	California, not brought this trend to an
11	abrupt halt. As I mentioned, though, the
12	existing deregulated markets are functioning
13	extremely well today.
14	Now, of equal importance, dramatic
15	changes at the wholesale level over the past
16	several decades have created significant
17	competitive pressure in generation markets.
18	Specifically, as you see here, much of the
19	country is served by organized wholesale
20	markets in which regular auctions for energy
21	and capacity, together with open-access
22	transmission tariffs, have created an
23	efficient generation market based on
24	competitive pricing. These markets are
25	successfully meeting security and reliability

1	requirements while delivering affordable,
2	competitively-priced electricity to consumers.
3	There are three primary benefits to
4	customers from competitive markets versus
5	regulated monopolies. The biggest one is the
6	same benefit that we see from competition
7	throughout our economy: Competition drives
8	prices down. It improves the quality of
9	service for consumers as multiple sellers
10	strive to innovate and achieve efficiencies or
11	accept lower returns in order to offer the
12	most attractive price and quality and to
13	acquire and maintain market share.
14	The increased market access that
15	renewable generation has experienced and
16	Mr. Davis was highlighting this, as well
17	over the past decade has helped drive prices
18	down to the point that solar and wind are the
19	cheapest sources of new energy on the market
20	today, and you see those solar utility
21	scale solar numbers circled in red up there on
22	the upper corner of that slide.
23	Second, in regulated generation markets,
24	customers typically are made to bear
25	construction and operating risks. It's the

1	rare occasion when regulated utilities are not
2	allowed to recover from ratepayers most of the
3	impact of construction delays and cost
4	overruns or, for that matter, unexpected
5	costs, such as coal-ash remediation. And
6	regulated utilities typically continue to
7	recover generation plant costs, regardless of
8	their operating performance.
9	In other words, investor-owned utilities,
10	or IOUs, are able to privatize profits for
11	their shareholders and socialize risks by
12	passing them on to ratepayers.
13	By contrast, where energy and capacity
14	are provided by independent power producers,
15	which I'll refer to as "IPPs," their
16	investors, not the ratepayers, bear all of
17	these risks.
18	Finally, a huge benefit of a competitive
19	market is that it gives customers choice as to
20	the type of product they buy and the seller
21	they deal with. The electric-generation
22	sector is one of the few in our economy where
23	customers don't have that choice, even when
24	they desperately want it.
25	In particular, a huge and growing number

1	of private-sector companies, public and
2	private institutions, and local governments
3	have committed to procuring renewable energy,
4	in many cases, having made 100 percent
5	renewable pledges. I think there's something
6	like 74 Fortune 500 companies that have gone
7	100 percent renewable. I think I saw that
8	there are 88 local governments across the
9	country that have made similar pledges.
10	Whether the state's regulatory framework
11	supports that choice is an important factor in
12	these companies' consideration when they
13	decide where to locate or expand.
14	Now, similarly, among the general public,
15	polling data from a range of credible sources
16	shows a not sure why I'm a little trigger
17	happy here this is a slide that shows
18	polling data, and you'll see at the top 89
19	percent of the public favoring an increase in
20	solar-farm deployment.
21	Now, in a regulated generation market
22	like South Carolina's, these customers have no
23	ready ability to meet these goals. Since they
24	have to buy all their power from the utility,
25	their energy profile will necessarily be the
•	

1	profile of the utility, which might be closer
2	to 30 percent coal, 35 percent natural gas, 30
3	percent nuclear, and, say, just 5 percent
4	renewables. As I said, it's critically
5	important that mechanisms be in place to allow
б	customers to meet their requirements and
7	preferences for a hundred percent clean
8	energy, or they simply may decide not to make
9	further investments in the state.
10	Now, the last time I was here, I spoke to
11	you about Senate Bill 987, which was
12	introduced in the last session, which was a
13	mechanism to address exactly this issue of
14	providing commercial and industrial customers
15	with access to renewable energy in the context
16	of today's regulated generation market. So I
17	don't plan to revisit that today, unless you
18	may have any questions.
19	But I will say that effective competition
20	from solar-independent power producers is
21	especially important here in South Carolina,
22	because the generation options are limited.
23	The latest South Carolina nuclear experiment
24	at VC Summer was not successful, and there's
25	little prospect that further nuclear-project

1	development will be undertaken. New coal is
2	not a viable option for our use today due to
3	its emissions profile. The availability of
4	cleaner, cheaper alternatives, like renewables
5	and gas, and, frankly, for the reasons I've
6	said, a huge portion of the customers simply
7	don't want it.
8	Same time, a diverse-resource portfolio
9	is critical to mitigating risks and cost
10	effectively meeting system demands.
11	Overcommitting to natural gas, in addition to
12	its environmental impacts, will subject
13	ratepayers to potentially disastrous risks of
14	fuel-price increases and volatility. We were
15	recently reminded of that volatility when the
16	market price for natural gas unexpectedly shot
17	up 10 percent during the past few weeks, and
18	no one can say for sure how far prices will
19	move back down or when they might suddenly
20	escalate again.
21	It is noted utility-scale solar is the
22	least-cost option in the market today, and
23	IPPs, importantly, can deliver solar at a
24	lower cost than IOUs. IPP Solar Development
25	has the potential to bring billions of

1	dollars, as Mr. Davis said, in investment to
2	the state that will directly benefit some of
3	South Carolina's poorest and most rural
4	counties.
5	Now, with that background, let me say, I
6	don't mention any of that and the importance
7	of competition to suggest to you that South
8	Carolina should deregulate its electric-
9	generation sector.
10	Rather, my purpose is to talk with you
11	about some of the ways to better capture the
12	benefits of competition in customer choice in
13	the context of continued a continued
14	regulated-monopoly regime.
15	The key thing is that, to capture the
16	benefits of a competitive market for
17	consumers, it's essential that there be more
18	than one player in the market. It's essential
19	that IPPs, like SCSBA's members, have
20	meaningful nondiscriminatory access to the
21	generation market, and I'll talk about some
22	ways that that can occur.
23	For a start, federal law requires that we
24	have such access, specifically under the
25	Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, or

1	PURPA. As you know, PURPA requires electric
2	utilities to purchase the output of certain
3	IPPs, called "qualifying facilities," or
4	"QFs," at the cost that the utility would
5	otherwise incur to generate or purchase such
6	energy and capacity.
7	I know you're familiar with PURPA, and my
8	intention today is not to discuss its
9	requirements and benefits in detail, but they
10	are briefly summarized in these slides, which
11	you in this slide, which you have.
12	But, in connection with my discussion of
13	the importance of competitive pressure on
14	monopoly pricing, I do want to say that it's
15	important that state commissions implement
16	PURPA in a manner that does, in fact, give QFs
17	meaningful market access.
18	The most important conditions for such
19	access are these: First of all, a properly-
20	calculated avoided-cost rate that accurately
21	reflects the utility's true avoided costs.
22	Second, a long-term fixed-price contract
23	that gives QFs a reasonable opportunity to
24	attract capital as FERC requires.
25	And, finally, nondiscriminatory

1	interconnection access to the utility's
2	transmission and distribution system, a
3	subject that we have addressed in prior ex
4	parte briefings before you.
5	COMMISSIONER ERVIN: Steve, may I
6	interrupt you
7	MR. LEVITAS: Yes.
8	COMMISSIONER ERVIN: for a question?
9	MR. LEVITAS: Yes. Absolutely.
10	COMMISSIONER ERVIN: When you say long-
11	term fixed-price contracts, is there a best-
12	practices kind of scale where it'd be like 20
13	years or something less? More or less?
14	MR. LEVITAS: Thank you for that
15	question. It varies a lot across the country.
16	FERC has not dictated a one-size-fits-all. It
17	has, as I said, said that the contracts have
18	to be of sufficient length, and the exact
19	words are "to give the QF a reasonable
20	opportunity to attract capital." So that's
21	going to vary by market, depending on the
22	price and land cost and other factors
23	jurisdiction-specific factors.
24	I can tell you that and I was about to
25	mention this from our standpoint, there are

1	many states in the country that we don't
2	believe have complied with this requirement
3	and that allow utilities to offer very short
4	contracts, variable-price contracts, but there
5	are many states around the country that do
6	prescribe longer-term contracts.
7	Michigan just approved a 20-year contract
8	in the last year or well, the final order
9	just went into effect the other day;
10	Washington State, I believe, is looking at 15
11	years; Minnesota, 20 years; Montana, which has
12	not been a real friend to QFs, is at 15 years,
13	down from 25, but there are certainly shorter
14	places.
15	But I think one of the things that
16	there's discussion at the Federal level about
17	possible changes to PURPA, and one of the ones
18	that I think is most important is to try to
19	get some kind of standardization, rebuttable
20	presumption, because we wind up litigating and
21	fighting about it, and it ought to be
22	something that has a little more uniformity.
23	COMMISSIONER ERVIN: And I understand
24	that, in North Carolina, our neighboring state
25	has adopted a statutory scheme that is about

1	to be implemented or and since some of the
2	territory bleeds into our state are you
3	familiar with that scheme? Are you going to
4	address that for us?
5	MR. LEVITAS: I'll say a little bit about
6	that. I wasn't going to say anything about it
7	in the context of the contract length, but I
8	will tell you this and I was intimately
9	involved with the legislation last year in
10	North Carolina that legislation reflected a
11	conscious attempt, after years of successful
12	PURPA implementation that stimulated many,
13	many gigawatts of IPP solar development, to
14	move away from that, just to a different
15	regime, which I'll talk about. And the five-
16	year PPA length that was adopted by the
17	legislature in North Carolina was specifically
18	adopted for the purpose of shutting down
19	PURPA, so that the migration to competitive
20	solicitation would be successful.
21	So I don't think you can look at it as an
22	example where a state is in the earlier stages
23	of PURPA implementation and say, "Oh, well,
24	five years has been agreed to be a workable
25	solution." It was consciously intended not to

1	allow contracts to occur under PURPA.
2	COMMISSIONER ERVIN: That answers my
3	question. Thank you.
4	MR. LEVITAS: So, as I was saying,
5	despite clear mandates from Congress and FERC,
6	we have unfortunately seen, across many states
7	in the country, a failure to comply with PURPA
8	and to implement it as intended and,
9	particularly, around this issue of contract
10	length.
11	And, on that point, I would say that it's
12	just important to remember that no utility
13	would ever build major-generation
14	infrastructure without long-term stability as
15	to cost recovery. And that includes utility
16	affiliates.
17	This is a slide relating to Duke
18	Renewables, Duke Energy's non-regulated
19	affiliate, that is effectively a competitor of
20	ours in many markets. It's one of the leading
21	renewable-energy developers in the country,
22	and we're not aware that Duke Renewables has
23	ever entered into a our purchase agreement
24	of less than 15 years, and you see that the
25	average is over 18 years.

1	Now, I try to have honest conversations
2	and hear what other folks have to say about
3	PURPA, and one common argument that you hear
4	is that long-term, fixed-price contracts could
5	turn out to be inaccurate, and, if they're too
6	high if the projections or forecasts are
7	too high, the ratepayers could suffer.
8	And the response that I'd make to that is
9	that's exactly the same risk that customers
10	face every time a regulatory commission like
11	this one approves long-term cost recovery for
12	a utility's generation asset, and, you know,
13	unfortunately, here in South Carolina, we're
14	all too familiar with that phenomenon.
15	And the other thing that I think it's
16	really important to know and I talked about
17	it earlier is the risk allocation; it's
18	really important. When IPP transactions
19	occur, there are no risks on ratepayers if
20	things go bad. If we don't perform, if our
21	costs are too high, we bear all those risks.
22	Our investors don't get any money. There's no
23	opportunity to come to you and say, "Things
24	didn't work out well. Will you pay us let
25	us get paid anyway?" and make the customers

1	eat the cost of something that delivers no
2	value to them.
3	Now, another common concern about PURPA
4	is that it requires utilities to purchase the
5	output of facilities that the utilities say
6	they don't want or need or that may present
7	operational challenges. I have responses to
8	those concerns.
9	The first thing that I would say is PURPA
10	doesn't actually require a utility to pay a QF
11	for a capacity that the utility doesn't need.
12	So there's the energy component of what it
13	costs and the capacity component. It's very
14	clear, if the utility doesn't need capacity,
15	doesn't have need for any new plants, they
16	don't pay us for capacity.
17	With respect to energy, utilities that
18	don't that have all the capacity they need
19	almost always have a need for energy. If you
20	think about what does that mean, a regulated
21	utility serves its existing load largely by
22	operating its existing fleet, which involves
23	costs for fuel, for operations, for
24	maintenance; that's energy. They do that
25	every day, and they have a need to do that

1	every day to serve their load. So PURPA
2	simply gives IPPs the opportunity to meet that
3	need if we can do so at comparable costs.
4	The operational issues only come into
5	play when there is a high degree of renewable
6	penetration, and certainly Duke made that case
7	in North Carolina. I think that was
8	influential. We didn't necessarily agree with
9	all of it, but it was influential with our
10	commission because we had had so much
11	renewable penetration come on so fast. But we
12	would like to see the utilities put their
13	considerable talent to bear in solving these
14	problems of integrating renewables that are so
15	much in demand and not just flagging the
16	problems.
17	So I think these concerns about PURPA are
18	overstated, but I really wanted kind of the
19	heart of my thoughts that I want to share with
20	you today is about a partial substitute for
21	PURPA that is another way to provide benefits
22	of competition in a regulated market. So
23	that's what I'm really here to talk about.
24	PURPA is what we've had to date, and as I
25	said, it is specifically designed to provide

1	competitive pressure in a regulated market.
2	But there's an alternative. And that is a
3	meaningful, inclusive, and technically sound,
4	integrated resource planning process and a
5	resource planning process that is combined
6	with a properly designed and fairly
7	administered competitive solicitation process,
8	so a IRP RFP.
9	This type of procurement regime, which
10	has been successfully deployed in Colorado, is
11	very close to what's been recently proposed by
12	NARUC, your national association, as an
13	alternative to PURPA. This is just a cover
14	page from the proposal that they released a
15	week and a half ago, and I'm headed from here
16	to a conference in Arizona to respond to this
17	report and the authors. It should be an
18	interesting discussion.
19	So, as I said, NARUC is proposing a move
20	toward a IRP RFP model, but it's really
21	important to recognize that, in regulated
22	markets, the kind of solicitations NARUC
23	proposes have only been applied to the
24	procurement of new resources. So this model
25	works really well if you're saying, "We need

1	500 megawatts of new capacity. Let's go into
2	the market and figure out how to get it in the
3	most cost-effective way." But in the absence
4	of a structured wholesale market, it's really
5	difficult, if not impossible, to imagine how
6	utilities would procure all of their energy
7	needs on a competitive basis. I'm not aware
8	that those types of procurements are going on
9	anywhere in the country in regulated markets.
10	I mentioned the Colorado model. It has
11	shown how competitive procurement can lower
12	costs for ratepayers. This slide's a little
13	hard to follow, but Xcel in Colorado put out
14	an all-resource bid in 2017 to replace 450
15	megawatts of retiring coal capacity. Wind,
16	solar, and storage from IPPs emerged as the
17	best and most cost-effective options, and the
18	prices were extremely low.
19	(Indicating.) I seem to hit this twice
20	every time. Maybe I'll get it figured out
21	before we're done.
22	In 2016, the Michigan legislature enacted
23	a rigorous new IRP process under which the
24	first IRP was recently filed by Consumers
25	Energy. We're heavily involved in that
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1	proceeding, and interestingly, Consumers
2	proposes to accelerate coal plant retirements,
3	do no new gas plant construction, increase the
4	use of demand-side management and energy
5	efficiency, and procure around 6 gigawatts of
6	competitively procured solar resources. So
7	there's certainly some things about the
8	proposal that we think need some work, but
9	that basic framework, again, the IRP used to
10	define what the need is, and the commission
11	there will complete that proceeding in the
12	late spring of next year. And then, just as
13	in Colorado, it's that IRP that drives the
14	procurement and what gets built.
15	Now, you asked about House Bill 589
16	passed by North Carolina's General Assembly
17	last year. As I said, that was specifically
18	designed to migrate the state away from its
19	longstanding approach to PURPA implementation
20	to an independently administered competitive
21	procurement regime. In that case, the
22	legislature, rather than going through a IRP
23	process at the front end, directed Duke Energy
24	to competitively procure more than 2600
25	megawatts of new renewable resources. This

1	was on top of what was assumed to be a
2	baseline of 3500 megawatts that would be
3	deployed prior to this RFP process. And then,
4	for the commission subsequent to that, through
5	an IRP to determine what need would exist
6	beyond that initial addition of 2600
7	megawatts.
8	It's been a really interesting learning
9	process in North Carolina. There's a lot that
10	we can share from other states that can help
11	guide both future procurements in North
12	Carolina and elsewhere.
13	This IRP RFP model, in my opinion, is a
14	great improvement over what we have typically
15	seen in most Southeastern states where
16	utilities have been able to obtain commission
17	approval for major generation investments
18	without being required, first of all, to go
19	through an open, transparent, and
20	participatory resource-planning process that
21	determines and drives exactly what type and
22	capacity resources get built, and then
23	following on to that, to competitively bid
24	generation procurement with open access to
25	that bidding process for all participants.

1	As I imagine you know, the South Carolina
2	State Energy Plan, developed under the
3	guidance of ORS's energy office, has
4	identified best practices for utility-
5	integrated resource planning as a top priority
6	for South Carolina. I have another slide
7	that's a little hard to read here, but these
8	practices include utilities holding public
9	engagement sessions to discuss changes to its
10	IRP and gather feedback; analyzing multiple
11	resource portfolios with a range of demand-
12	side and supply-side options; conducting
13	multiple sensitivity analyses that consider
14	uncertainty around factors like fuel costs and
15	load growth; and evaluating retirement options
16	for existing assets.
17	My personal view is that a monopoly
18	utility should never be allowed to build a
19	generation resource unless two conditions have
20	been met: First, the need for the quantity
21	and the type of additional capacity needs to
22	have been determined by the commission through
23	a rigorous, inclusive, and transparent
24	process; second, no utility should be allowed
25	to build any new resources itself unless it

1	has prevailed in an inclusive, properly
2	designed, and fairly and independently
3	administered competitive process that is open
4	to all market participants.
5	Now, I've heard questions or concerns
6	expressed about how the introduction of these
7	competitive pressures on the generation side
8	may affect the economic stability of IOUs, and
9	that certainly merits consideration. First of
10	all, as I've said, the IOUs will continue to
11	own and operate their transmission and
12	distribution businesses the way they always
13	have. Even where operation of the
14	transmission system is placed in the hands of
15	an independent system operator, this T&D
16	transmission and distribution remains a very
17	healthy, sustainable, and expanding business
18	proposition for IOUs. There are billions of
19	dollars of investment needed and planned and
20	discussed with respect to grid improvements
21	that provide substantial opportunities for
22	earnings and profitability for utilities.
23	There's also a good deal of discussion
24	going on about the so-called "utility business
25	model of the future," including alternative

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	1	models in which utilities are not compensated
	2	based on how much they build or sell, but on
	3	performance standards and the delivery of
	4	services to the public. And I think these
	5	bear considerations here and elsewhere, but I
	б	certainly agree that, as long as utilities
	7	continue to play a role in generation and
	8	specifically in managing a balancing
	9	authority area to ensure that we have system
	10	reliability, they should absolutely be
	11	compensated for doing so.
	12	I also believe that competition from IPPs
	13	should not create stranded assets for IOUs and
	14	that they should continue to be fairly
	15	compensated for prudent investments that
	16	they've made in the past. But the decisions
	17	about the proper mix of new generation
	18	resources should be driven by sound resource
	19	planning, competitive pricing, and customer
	20	interests, not by shareholder interests.
	21	Got one more slide? Maybe not.
	22	So let me just conclude by saying thank
	23	you, again, for the opportunity to be here.
	24	These topics are all very much connected. The
	25	issue of the need for competitive pressure,
1		

1	the potential to do that through a more robust
2	and rigorous planning process, leading to a
3	fairly administered, competitive solicitation
4	process, coupled with more robust and
5	appropriate implementation of PURPA because
6	the competitive solicitation model that I
7	outlined, as I said, doesn't get you all the
8	way there. It helps solve the approach on how
9	we procure new resources, but the new
10	resources are the tail of the dog. That may
11	be 10 percent of the way in which of the
12	way in which 10 percent of the existing load
13	is met, so we have to have a mechanism like
14	PURPA to continue to place competitive
15	pressure on how the utilities' ongoing energy
16	needs are met.
17	But I'll stop there. I don't know if you
18	want to wait and hold questions till all of us
19	are done, but I'll hand things over to Dr.
20	DiFelice.
21	DR. DIFELICE: Thank you, Mr. Levitas.
22	Vice Chairman, thank you for having me.
23	Commissioners, it's good to be here. My
24	name's Ron DiFelice, and I've got 10 minutes
25	to educate you all on a very complex topic,

1	and that is energy storage. And that's an
2	industry that I've been a part of for about 17
3	years now in various capacities, pardon the
4	pun, and in the last five years in particular,
5	through my consulting firm Energy Intelligence
6	Partners, we've spent a lot of time with
7	utilities, Fortune 500 companies, and others
8	trying to help them understand the emerging
9	opportunities that energy storage presents for
10	the grid.
11	And so, to give you the message of why
12	this time is different for energy storage and
13	how its time has arrived, we need to kind of
14	look back and see what people have expected
15	from energy storage for the past five to ten
16	years.
17	And so this chart here and it may be
18	one that you've seen before it's got
19	"energy storage duration" of the asset on the
20	x-axis, and it's got all the different buckets
21	of services that energy storage can provide to
22	the grid on the y. And you can see that
23	energy storage can provide a wide range of
24	benefits for the grid everywhere from bulk
25	energy to T&D, renewables integration, and for

1	consumers' demand-charge management, so
2	behind-the-meter energy storage is a great
3	asset for that.
4	So this has all been known and talked
5	about for a long time, so what's different?
6	What's changed? What you're looking at here
7	is a chart from Bloomberg New Energy Finance
8	that shows the decline in pricing for lithium
9	ion battery cells measured in dollars per
10	kilowatt hour. And you can see, from 2010 to
11	this year, the drop has been tremendous, about
12	80 percent.
13	A little known fact is it's being driven
14	by the EV markets. So billions are being
15	invested right now into electric vehicles, and
16	there are hundreds of gigawatt hours of
17	capacity being built around the world right
18	now to supply the budding EV market. The
19	stationary energy storage market is going to
20	benefit from all that investment and the price
21	declines that we are seeing.
22	I also want to point out that there is a
23	magic threshold here of \$100 per kWh for
24	energy storage where most experts predict the
25	markets that I've shown on the previous slide

1	will be dominated with by energy storage.
2	Bloomberg projects that to be out in 2025, and
3	this is a report from this year. Tesla has
4	stated publicly that they will meet that
5	threshold next year. And we are also very
6	bullish that we are going to see pricing come
7	down faster than predicted. And this is going
8	to have big implications for where and how
9	energy storage is deployed.
10	So you get a idea of this not being a
11	localized market phenomenon, I wanted to share
12	with you some slides from the Energy
13	Information Administration. So what you're
14	looking at is a chart from 2012 that shows
15	energy storage deployments across the country.
16	The size of the data points are indicative of
17	the megawatts deployed. And if you fast-
18	forward six years and look at that map, you
19	can see the widescale adoption across the
20	country. So we're not just talking about
21	states like California and Hawaii. Energy
22	storage makes sense in a lot of markets today,
23	and it's going to make sense in a lot more
24	markets in the next couple of years.
25	To further drive home the point that this

1	is coming to the South, I want to draw your
2	attention to this headline, which is from Duke
3	Energy just this month, which touts their
4	allocation of about \$500 million to go into
5	energy storage investment across the
6	Carolinas.
7	The backdrop of this this graphic is a
8	chart from Greentech Media. They do a nice
9	job of tracking the deployments over time by
10	year, and they also break it up by
11	application. So you've got residential and
12	C&I, which are behind the meter, and then
13	you've got utility scale, which we call "front
14	of the meter," and it's going to be dominated
15	by front-of-the-meter utility scale. They're
16	projecting 1 gigawatt deployed in 2019, and
17	that's going to double in 2020. And so this
18	year between this year and next year, we're
19	talking about 5X what was deployed in 2016, so
20	we're seeing tremendous growth in lithium-ion
21	battery deployment.
22	What are the utilities using it for? In
23	unregulated markets like PJM, energy storage
24	has been used for several years now for
25	frequency regulation services, but it's not

1	just for ancillary services. This is a simple
2	example of how energy storage can be used for
3	time-shifting in places like the Southeast.
4	And so I think everyone knows that
5	electrons delivered during the peak period for
6	a utility are the most expensive electrons to
7	generate and deliver. So the benefit of energy
8	storage, when coupled with renewables, is you
9	can charge the batteries with the solar or
10	wind when you need it and then deploy them
11	specifically into your peak periods. And this
12	study, which was based on 2011 data, just came
13	out in 2018 from the National Renewable Energy
14	Lab, and it showed the impact on the state of
15	California of over 4 gigawatts of storage, and
16	you can see the variability during that 24-
17	hour period shrinks greatly with energy
18	storage, which is exactly what the utility
19	wants to see.
20	You may have heard the word, or the term,
21	"benefit stacking" in relation to energy
22	storage, and what that means is using the
23	storage asset for more than one thing at
24	different times. It's a great idea on paper.
25	It doesn't work quite yet in the real world
•	

1	with too many applications, because the
2	lifetime of the battery is greatly affected if
3	you do that and try to do too much with it.
4	I'm not talking about benefit stacking
5	with this slide. I'm talking about if a
б	storage asset is deployed just for time-
7	shifting, so for one application. A grid is
8	going to see all these other ancillary
9	benefits because storage is deployed in that
10	way. So from T&D deferral, your power quality
11	goes up. Your heat rate goes down on that
12	system, your air-emissions benefits are
13	obvious, and your pricing risk your fuel
14	pricing risk you don't have to deal with
15	that as opposed to peaker plants.
16	And so this graphic this pie chart
17	here in the bottom right is from PJM, and it
18	shows it basically deconstructs what's in a
19	kilowatt hour delivered, cost-wise, and so
20	that's going to vary from market to market,
21	and South Carolina's is going to look
22	different, but the point is: Energy storage
23	is going to decrease the cost in every one of
24	those slices of the pie because it's such a
25	versatile tool.

1	So those are my comments about energy
2	storage. I'm happy to take questions, but the
3	again, the point that I wanted to leave you
4	with is it's not something that's coming in
5	five years or ten years. Energy storage is
6	here; the pricing is only going to get better;
7	and it's we think in the next five to ten
8	years it's going to impact every aspect of how
9	a utility generates, transmits, distributes
10	energy its energy. Thank you for your
11	time.
12	VICE CHAIRMAN ELAM: Thank you.
13	Commissioners? Questions? Go ahead,
14	Commissioner Hamilton.
15	COMMISSIONER HAMILTON: Thank you, Mr.
16	Chairman. I have one question. We in the
17	points that you just made, Mr. DiFelice, and
18	we've talked about it before, about baseload
19	generation from solar and battery storage.
20	Where are we now?
21	DR. DIFELICE: Is that directed to me?
22	COMMISSIONER HAMILTON: Yes, sir.
23	DR. DIFELICE: So we very much look at
24	solar plus storage as a capacity asset. So
25	when you add storage, you can deploy it when

you need it, and that's very different than a renewable asset without storage, of course. So there's an energy component and an energy value to storage and there's also a capacity value to storage, just like you have with a peaker. COMMISSIONER HAMILTON: Would either of you gentlemen have anything to add? MR. DAVIS: I think I'll just add, Commissioner Hamilton, that he way we think about energy portfolio is diversity, and so if you're building a peaker, you're not building it for baseload, and if you're building a solar farm, you're not building for baseload, so these are different pieces of pie that interact with each other and give you an overall system that meets customer needs. With the addition of storage, you add flexibility to that intermittent resource that we have today, but regardless of the storage component, there's still a role that solar plays that's you know, produces the value to the system. COMMISSIONER HAMILTON: Thank you very much. That was an excellent presentation.		
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25 much. That was an excellent presentation.	24	COMMISSIONER HAMILTON: Thank you very
	25	much. That was an excellent presentation.

1	Appreciate it.
2	MR. LEVITAS: I was just going to say
3	that, I don't have a citation for you, but I
4	did read something in the trade press in the
5	last month, I'd say, that said the cost of
6	solar plus storage is pretty close already to
7	being able to displace gas peaking plants, and
8	this was an energy trade magazine that was
9	suggesting we're not going to see gas peaking
10	plants built very much more in the future.
11	COMMISSIONER HAMILTON: Thank you very
12	much. I appreciate the presentation. It was
13	excellent.
14	MR. DAVIS: Thank you, Commissioner.
15	VICE CHAIRMAN ELAM: Commissioner Ervin?
16	COMMISSIONER ERVIN: Ron, I know we're
17	talking about solar today, but the advances in
18	battery technology, is it safe to assume we'll
19	also benefit wind
20	DR. DIFELICE: That's correct.
21	COMMISSIONER ERVIN: in the same way?
22	DR. DIFELICE: Exactly, yeah.
23	COMMISSIONER ERVIN: And make it a more
24	cost-effective option?
25	DR. DIFELICE: In some markets like

1	Texas, you may know that the value of
2	electricity goes negative when there's too
3	much wind on the grid, and energy storage can
4	certainly solve that problem for that
5	electricity for later and deploy it when
6	needed.
7	COMMISSIONER ERVIN: Thank you.
8	MR. DAVIS: And and just speaking,
9	Commissioner Ervin, to the slide that Steve
10	put up related to Colorado and Xcel's RFP last
11	year all-source bid, they had a 450
12	megawatt capacity need and were fully
13	anticipating that natural gas would come in
14	lowest, and it was actually wind, solar, plus
15	storage. So you are seeing storage show up in
16	that mix with both wind and solar today and
17	out-competing other resources.
18	COMMISSIONER ERVIN: I think I saw in the
19	Washington Post this morning that the current
20	administration is looking favorably on wind,
21	and they're actually talking to California
22	about coordinating, you know, floating wind
23	turbines so because the shelf is much
24	deeper than it is on the East Coast. But I
25	thought it was interesting that

1	collaboration, at least. We haven't seen that
2	in some other areas.
3	MR. DAVIS: And we we do have that
4	offshore resource here in South Carolina. I
5	assume at some point in the future it will
6	enter into these conversations, but, for now,
7	we've got sunshine that's ready.
8	COMMISSIONER ERVIN: Well, I found it
9	very informative and an excellent
10	presentation. I appreciate all of you
11	attending today.
12	MR. DAVIS: Thank you.
13	VICE CHAIRMAN ELAM: Well, if there are
14	no more, I have a couple, and I'll just throw
15	the questions out and you you can choose
16	who answers them. I believe y'all stated that
17	most of the PPAs in South Carolina are in
18	SCE&G territory. Is there a particular reason
19	for that?
20	MR. DAVIS: I think the solar industry
21	has found moving through the interconnection
22	queue and the availability of contract length
23	that's financeable has been available in SC&EG
24	territory, and so it's driven that growth.
25	VICE CHAIRMAN ELAM: Okay. Now,

1	concerning the length of contracts you were
2	asked about that is there a contract length
3	that's set forth in the North Carolina
4	legislation or the North Carolina Commission
5	ordered?
6	MR. LEVITAS: Yes, sir. It's for the
7	so we have a standard offer program for the
8	smaller QFs, which was recently downsized to 1
9	megawatt. That is a 10-year PPA down from 15
10	where it had been for many years. For non-
11	standard-offer projects, anything over 1
12	megawatt, it's a 5-year PPA term. And, as I
13	mentioned, I was deeply involved in that
14	legislation, and that 5-year number was not
15	settled at through a process of trying to
16	figure out what would work; it was through a
17	process of trying to figure out would not
18	work.
19	MR. DAVIS: Steve, what's the contract
20	length for CPRE projects?
21	MR. LEVITAS: Yeah, so at the same time
22	that the that these changes were made to
23	migrate the state from PURPA implementation to
24	competitive solicitation, the competitive
25	solicitation program that has been put in

1	place to supplant PURPA, if you will, provides
2	for 20-year PPAs.
3	VICE CHAIRMAN ELAM: Okay. Just so I can
4	understand, you said you were involved in that
5	legislation; I take it you don't agree with
6	everything that came out of it.
7	MR. LEVITAS: Well, I was no, we
8	effected it in in the back-and-forth of the
9	legislative process, we reached a negotiated
10	agreement with the utilities. The things that
11	were important to our side one of the
12	things that happened was that that was
13	very important to that deal getting done was
14	grandfathering of a significant portion of the
15	existing queue at the existing PURPA rates, so
16	any time you're going to transition from one
17	regime to another, you've got the issue: What
18	do we do about the people who were in the
19	middle of trying to get business done under
20	the old regime? So a key part of that
21	legislation that led to our willingness to
22	support some of the changes was that
23	grandfathering. In addition, I mentioned the
24	2660 megawatts of commitment to new renewables
25	procurement, most of which will be solar, as

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	1	well as a 600 megawatt, what we call a "Green
	2	Source Advantage Program," which is that
	3	program I alluded to in the legislation I
	4	worked on here in South Carolina, to try to
	5	give access for the commercial industrial
	6	customer. So, in total, we had 3260 megawatts
	7	of new solar procurement committed to in
	8	legislation, and that is, as far as I know,
	9	almost unheard of as a legislative commitment
	10	in the country. And so in exchange for both
	11	the grandfathering of a significant quantity
	12	of existing projects, a very large commitment
	13	to new renewables procurement, the solar
	14	industry in North Carolina was willing to
	15	migrate away from a pure PURPA regime and
	16	accept a term which, yes, we didn't like it
	17	we didn't like it going in, but we agreed to
	18	it as part of a comprehensive negotiation.
	19	VICE CHAIRMAN ELAM: Okay. Was the
	20	grandfathering effective on the date of the
	21	effective date of the act, or was that the
	22	issue date?
	23	MR. LEVITAS: The projects well, since
	24	I thought about this but it was projects
	25	had to have formed what's made the
1	İ	

1	determined in PURPA a legally enforceable
2	obligation prior to a date certain that
3	preceded the act. I believe that date was
4	November 15, 2016. So any projects that had
5	effectively communicated to the utility their
6	commitment to sell their output by that date
7	retained their eligibility for the old rates
8	under PURPA.
9	VICE CHAIRMAN ELAM: Okay. It didn't
10	create some at some future date where you
11	would have some sort of rush on the queue?
12	MR. LEVITAS: No.
13	VICE CHAIRMAN ELAM: Okay.
14	MR. LEVITAS: And it would all of the
15	projects that were grandfathered had taken the
16	necessary steps prior to the effective date of
17	the legislation to become grandfathered.
18	VICE CHAIRMAN ELAM: Talking about
19	lengths of contracts, is that in any way, in
20	your thinking, tied to the useful life of a
21	solar panel?
22	MR. LEVITAS: Well, we have seen as a
23	industry norm unlike utility assets which
24	typically do seek to obtain cost recovery over
25	the full life useful life of the asset, we

1	have not had that expectation because the
2	useful life of our solar assets could be 35
3	years or longer. And that has not been a
4	market standard to do 35-year PPAs, so we do
5	have some risk, if you will, as to what the
6	contract terms, pricing, and contract length
7	will be after an initial contract term. But,
8	generally, what we've experienced is that, on
9	the strength of a reasonable initial contract
10	term, that we can finance these projects and
11	that we and our investors and financing
12	parties are willing to take risks with respect
13	to what happens after the term of that initial
14	PPA.
15	VICE CHAIRMAN ELAM: Does that element of
16	risk include, just, technological advances to
17	the point where panels are a lot more
18	efficient and producing a lot more, more
19	cheaply?
20	MR. LEVITAS: Well, as long as PURPA is
21	in place, the risk is somewhat mitigated
22	because we do have a federal program that
23	requires the utilities to buy our offtake.
24	We have that regulatory risk that that
25	environment may change. So I don't think
11	

1	if PURPA were to remain as is, then there is
2	less risk because those projects would be in
3	place and would have rights under federal law
4	to sell their output under a new contract. I
5	think it's a bit more interesting in the
6	competitive solicitation environment. I
7	mentioned the 20-year contract term under the
8	North Carolina program, which, by the way, the
9	utility has a right to participate in, so they
10	face the same risk calculation that we do.
11	And so, it's unclear what's going to happen at
12	the end of the 20 years of these projects that
13	may get that will get selected in the
14	competitive process, but I assume there will
15	be a future competitive process after 20
16	years, and they'll and, to your point,
17	Commissioner Elam, either they'll be
18	successful in competing at that future point
19	in time, or they may be overtaken by new
20	technology and not be successful.
21	VICE CHAIRMAN ELAM: Final thing, you
22	talked about various states having competitive
23	generation for decades, and you said you
24	weren't asking for that here. Do solar
25	companies, such as the ones you deal with, do

1	better in competitive generation states than
2	they do in vertically integrated states?
3	MR. LEVITAS: Well, we certainly have
4	more readily available market access in that
5	we can readily sell our output without having
6	to jump through some of the hoops and deal
7	with some of the legal battles that we face in
8	regulated markets. And I touched on the
9	difference between the deregulated generation
10	markets and then the wholesale markets that
11	are more fluid and open, as well. Those are a
12	little more complicated. The larger
13	facilities have better access to sell into
14	those wholesale markets; smaller distribution-
15	connected resources don't have much
16	opportunity to participate. And FERC has not
17	recognized a PURPA exemption for facilities 20
18	megawatts and under in organized wholesale
19	markets. So I think the answer is, yes, but
20	as I said, we're not trying to seek that
21	outcome or a particular outcome. The
22	overarching goal that we have is to be able to
23	access the market, place downward competitive
24	pressure on pricing to the benefit of
25	consumers, and I tried to lay out a couple of

1	ways that we might get there.
2	VICE CHAIRMAN ELAM: Okay. That's all I
3	have. Is there anything else from the
4	commissioners?
5	COMMISSIONER ERVIN: I was told recently,
6	Steve, that some of the proposals have been
7	waiting in a queue for over two years with
8	Duke. And I'm just curious, do you have
9	since you're from, or familiar with, North
10	Carolina how do you explain that?
11	MR. LEVITAS: Well, we have had prior
12	presentations I think, prior to the time
13	that you were seated on the Commission, on,
14	specifically on the subject of
15	interconnection, and I want to be mindful of
16	my obligation not to talk about particular
17	utility rates.
18	COMMISSIONER ERVIN: Right. And I don't
19	want to single them out. But, just
20	hypothetically speaking, why would it take an
21	investor-owned utility that long to act on a
22	queue?
23	MR. LEVITAS: Well, I think and it's
24	not just here; it's not just one utility. But
25	we see problems all over the country with

1	interconnection, and I have been and I've
2	said this publicly I've been sympathetic to
3	a point with the utilities, recognizing that
4	they've seen a tremendous influx from new
5	generations, particularly renewable generation
6	projects, that place demands on their
7	resources. It takes time to study, time and
8	cost to study these projects, and, of course,
9	to build the facilities. But, that said, the
10	rate of progress, particularly here in South
11	Carolina, has been just absolutely
12	unacceptable, if you just look at the time
13	that projects are in the queue, the limited
14	number that have made it all the way through
15	and been interconnected, and this is true in
16	North Carolina, as well. And I think, just to
17	be honest about it, a sort of battlefront is
18	we see from the utilities a lot of claims
19	about technical standards and considerations
20	with respect to interconnection. And they, of
21	course, have a job to do to ensure system
22	reliability. And, you know, I generally have
23	high regard for the work that they do in that
24	area, but frankly, we have seen one claimed
25	technical screen after another, and ones that

1	we don't believe are actually present
2	problems that can't be overcome. And I just
3	think, given the huge benefits to ratepayers,
4	the huge demand for renewable energy and the
5	benefits that it provides to the system, we've
6	got a lot of smart folks out there in the
7	utility industry, and I'd like to see more
8	proactive, creative, aggressive efforts to
9	solve whatever problems there may be and get
10	these projects interconnected, rather than
11	every time we turn around having some new
12	obstacle thrown up in our path.
13	COMMISSIONER ERVIN: And that was some of
14	the impetus for the new legislation; is that
15	right? Because those that qualify under the
16	new legislation can kind of jump the queue?
17	MR. LEVITAS: Are you talking about the
18	North Carolina legislation?
19	COMMISSINER ERVIN: Yes, sir.
20	MR. LEVITAS: The legislation didn't
21	speak specifically to that, but the regulatory
22	proceedings that have followed on the
23	legislation have created a pathway to expedite
24	the interconnection of projects that are
25	selected in the competitive process.
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1	COMMISSIONER ERVIN: And that takes into
2	consideration some of the utilities' concerns
3	about location and need and accessibility?
4	MR. LEVITAS: Well, I think that's right.
5	And I didn't touch on that at any detail, but
6	I do think one, you know, potential
7	concern/legitimate concern, about PURPA is
8	that if you have a very high degree of PURPA
9	penetration, you do have the potential,
10	because one thing that PURPA allows is that we
11	cite facilities wherever we may choose to cite
12	them. And we recognize that that can present
13	challenges, that you may have facilities cited
14	that are remote from load or that present
15	other operational challenges. I think the
16	best way to address that is through the
17	pricing mechanism, and I'm supportive of the
18	idea that you shouldn't pay the price, same
19	price, to a qualifying facility that is not
20	located, effectively, relative to load. And
21	you see this in locational marginal pricing in
22	the organized wholesale markets. You don't
23	have a uniform price everywhere. There's a
24	recognition of supply and demand and where
25	that supply is most needed.

1	VICE CHAIRMAN ELAM: Okay. If there is
2	nothing further Mr. Whitt, anything
3	further for you?
4	Thank you, gentlemen. I appreciate the
5	presentation.
6	MR. DAVIS: Thank you, Commissioners, for
7	your attention.
8	MR. WHITT: The only thing to add is we
9	want to thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman, the
10	Commissioners, and Mr. Melchers, and your
11	staff for putting this together, and we
12	appreciate the opportunity to appear in front
13	of you. Thank you.
14	VICE CHAIRMAN ELAM: Thank you. Mr.
15	Nelson? Anything else? Anything you need
16	help getting anything?
17	MR. NELSON: I'll have a conversation with
18	Mr. Whitt when we're done, but I'm fine.
19	Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman.
20	VICE CHAIRMAN ELAM: Okay. Appearing
21	everything has been said that needs to be
22	said, we're adjourned.
23	(WHEREUPON, at 3:08 p.m. the
24	proceedings in the above-entitled
25	matter were adjourned.)

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